VI.

Post-World War II

By the 1950s, significant advances in missile technology had led to surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, air-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles, as well as missiles fired from under water, being adopted by the major powers. During the 1950s Cold War interception of big nuclear bombers was a major role for fighter strike aircraft. Low-flying strike aircraft were developed for air-to-air combat and close support of ground forces. With the development of land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) the importance of long-range strategic bombers lessened. The tactical use of piloted aircraft was, however, continued in the so-called limited wars fought after World War II.

The United States entered the Korean War using World War II propeller-driven aircraft, but soon employed the US F-80 and F-86 against the Russian-built MiG-15 in the first aerial combats between jet fighters. For political reasons, any air strikes by the US Air Force and Navy were limited to interdiction—that is, the prevention of enemy movements and destruction of their communications and supply lines by gunfire and bombing. In 1954 the doctrine of massive retaliation suggested that in future conflicts the superpowers would not necessarily confine air strikes to the local area of hostilities, but might strike at the enemy's homeland.

A.

The Vietnam War

Weaponry used in the Vietnam War included supersonic jets; the Russian-built MiG-17 and MiG-21 opposed the US F-105 and F-4. American pilots faced the substantial new menace of surface-to-air (SAM) missiles used for air defence. Electronic technology, however, provided them with laser-guided and optically guided bombs, missile-detection and radar-jamming countermeasures, and air-to-air and air-to-ground rockets. Avionics (electronics used in aviation) was a vital development in modern fighter aircraft. The development of aerial refuelling helped to extend the range of combat aircraft. On the other hand, the efforts of carrier-based aircraft were largely wasteful compared with their successes in World War II. It was in Vietnam that helicopters, initially used for observation, transport, and medical evacuation, became a significant combat weapon, and where the World War II C-47 cargo plane was converted into a gunship.

B.

The Gulf War and Kosovo

In January 1991, the role of air power in modern warfare was dramatically demonstrated during the Gulf War. Adhering to the military doctrine “Airland Battle”, behind-the-lines attacks were made on Iraqi command and control centres, communication facilities, supply depots, and reinforcement forces, and air superiority was established before armoured ground units moved in.

The initial attacks included Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from warships in the Gulf, F-117A Stealth fighter-bombers armed with laser-guided smart bombs, and F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft loaded with HARM anti-radar missiles. Timed to eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of Iraq's ground radar defences, these attacks permitted the F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, and Tornado fighter bombers to achieve air superiority and drop TV- and laser-guided bombs. The A-10 Thunderbolt, with its Gatling gun and heat-seeking or optically guided Maverick missiles, provided support for ground units and destroyed Iraqi armour. The AH-64 Apache and the AH-1 Cobra helicopters fired laser-guided Hellfire missiles, guided to tanks by ground observers or scout helicopters. Also essential to the allied air fleet were the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and an ageing fleet of B-52Gs.

Over 2,250 combat aircraft, including 1,800 US craft, participated against Iraq's approximately 500 Soviet-built MiG-29s and French-made Mirage F-1s. By the end of the fifth week, more than 88,000 combat missions had been flown by allied forces, with over 88,000 tons of bombs dropped.

In April 1999 NATO launched an air offensive against military, strategic, and political targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in an attempt to force the Yugoslav government to cease attacks on the Albanian civilian population of Kosovo. Using weapons technology little different to that employed in the Gulf War, NATO planes attacked their targets from bases in Italy, the Adriatic, the UK, and the US, dropping an estimated 23,000 bombs in the process. On June 3, 72 days after the NATO air strikes began, and with no ground forces having been employed, the FRY effectively admitted defeat and withdrew its forces from Kosovo. Within the FRY the NATO air campaign was estimated to have destroyed at least 55 road and railway bridges, 9 military airfields, and dozens of factories, oil refineries, power plants, water and sewage facilities, and government buildings; it also destroyed many homes. According to some preliminary estimates, air power had inflicted damage in excess of US$10 billion on the FRY. NATO also estimated that its air campaign had scored direct hits on 93 tanks, 153 armoured personnel carriers, 339 military vehicles, and 389 artillery pieces.

Although many believed at the time that air power alone had won the war, doubts have since been expressed on both the accuracy of NATO's figures and the accuracy of much of the air-to-ground weaponry employed in the conflict. It has been suggested that it was the threat of economic and political isolation that had persuaded the FRY to accede to NATO's demands rather than NATO's air offensive.