Zulu Wars

I

Introduction

Zulu Wars (1838-1888), series of conflicts in which the independent Zulu kingdom in Zululand in South Africa was invaded by Boer (Afrikaner) settlers, defeated by the British Empire, and fragmented, and its rebellion against white rule suppressed.

II

The Zulu Military System

Shaka, the Zulu kingdom’s founder, and his successors exercised social and economic control over their subjects through the military system. Periodically, men of the same age group from all over the kingdom were formed into a new impi (regiment) to join others already raised in serving the king for several months each year, herding his cattle, building his residences, policing his subjects, and fighting his external enemies. Women were also formed into such regiments to control their labour and to regulate when they could marry.

III

The Voortrekker Invasion (1838)

In October 1837 the Voortrekkers, or Boers from the Cape Colony (modern Cape Provinces), in search of new lands in the Great Trek, entered Zululand from the west and contacted the British traders established since 1824 at Port Natal (modern Durban). The Zulu king Dingane (who had assassinated his brother Shaka in 1828) realized he was faced with a formidable double threat. So, when a Voortrekker deputation under Piet Retief came to his capital, uMgungundlovu, he executed them on February 6, 1838, and sent his armies to obliterate the rest of the Voortrekkers in their scattered encampments in the foothills of the .

Despite suffering many casualties on February 16-17, the Voortrekkers in their wagon laagers (ringed encampments) succeeded in repulsing the Zulu. A mounted Voortrekker counter-raid under Hendrik Potgieter and Dirk Uys was ambushed and routed on April 10 at Thaleni Hill. Port Natal settlers in a supporting raid were likewise defeated at Ndondakusuka on April 17, and the Zulu went on to sack Port Natal on April 24. The Zulu army under Ndlela kaSompisi then attacked the prepared Boer position at Veglaer, but were thrown back in a three-day battle (August 13-15), which returned the initiative to the Voortrekkers.

These encounters suggested two basic military lessons: first, the Zulu, who endeavoured to surround their opponents and then to finish them off in hand-to-hand combat with the stabbing spear, could not succeed against an all-round defensive position and concentrated fire from muskets and cannon; second, they could win if they caught their colonial opponents scattered in the open where firearms were less effective. Both lessons were confirmed when the Voortrekkers under Andries Pretorius in their laager at Blood River decisively routed the Zulu army under Ndlela and Nzobo kaSobadli on December 16, 1838, but were then worsted in a running skirmish at Mthonjaneni on December 26. The Zulu had shown that they would not easily succumb to Boer penetration, but equally they had failed to drive off the Voortrekkers.

IV

The Anglo-Zulu War

The Zulu kingdom under Mpande (who, with Boer support, had overthrown his brother Dingane in battle between the Maqongqo Hills on January 29, 1840) now found itself wedged between British Natal, the new Boer South African Republic (modern Transvaal), and the Swazi kingdoms. The land-hungry Boers proved the greatest menace, since they were constantly trying to thrust into north-western Zululand. Mpande therefore cultivated good relations with the British to counteract the persistent Boer threat.

However, during the reign of Mpande’s son, Cetshwayo (who succeeded in 1872), the British, for reasons of imperial strategy, financial saving, and economic opportunity, began to confederate all the white states of southern Africa. They came to perceive the independent and militarily powerful Zululand as a potential threat to this process. Sir Henry Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner, consequently engineered a military confrontation that was calculated to destroy the Zulu military system.

On January 11, 1879, British and colonial forces under Lieutenant-General Frederic Thesiger, Lord Chelmsford, invaded Zululand. Three columns were ordered to converge on oNdini, Cetshwayo’s capital, to force a decisive battle and a quick end to the war. Chelmsford presumed that the fully mobilized Zulu army of 29,000 troops, who clung to their traditional fighting methods and made poor use of whatever firearms they possessed, would be no match for modern breech-loading rifles, artillery, and Gatling guns. However, the British advance became bogged down by inadequate transport and supply, and its strategy was dislocated on January 22 when the main Zulu army under Ntshingwayo kaMahole and Mavumengwana kaNdlela outmanoeuvred, divided, and annihilated the British centre column at Isandhlwana. The strategic picture was not changed by the Zulu failure that same night to capture the centre column’s depot at Rorke’s Drift, or by the right column’s success at Nyezane in fighting its way through an elaborate ambush. Chelmsford decided to retire to Natal to regroup, where he built up a total force of nearly 17,000 troops (7,000 of whom were black), and raised over 8,000 black levies to defend the borders of Natal. Meanwhile, he left the right column uselessly blockaded at Fort Eshowe, and relied on the left column based at Khambula to make the British presence felt through constant mounted raids.

Food supply problems and the need for ritual purification after battle meant that the Zulu were unable to mount a sustained campaign and press their advantage. However, they were ready for a second round by March, when the main Zulu army under Mnyamana kaNgqengelele marched against the troublesome left column. Overwhelming a large mounted patrol on Hlobane Mountain on March 28, they attacked the fort and laager at Khambula the next day. This was the hardest-fought and most decisive battle of the war, for the rout of the Zulu army permanently broke its morale. To compound this defeat, on April 2 Chelmsford’s Eshowe relief column, secure in its laager at Gingindlovu, broke a smaller Zulu army and evacuated the Eshowe garrison. The lessons of the war of 1838 against the Voortrekkers had been reinforced: the Zulu were helpless against concentrated firepower from behind all-round defences.

Chelmsford launched his second invasion in May. While his First Division moved cumbersomely up the coastal plain, the Second Division advanced into the Zulu heartland from the north-west in cooperation with the left column. The latter joined forces with Chelmsford, who drew up his troops as an impenetrable infantry square and conclusively routed the Zulu army at Ulundi on July 4. Lingering resistance ended with the capture of the fugitive Cetshwayo and the formal Zulu surrender on September 1. This defeat effectively ended Zulu independence, though Frere’s strategy and the confederation policy had also collapsed.