Hungarian Revolution

I

Introduction

Hungarian Revolution, violent, large-scale uprising against Communist rule and Soviet control in Hungary. It took place between late October and early November 1956. Along with the Prague Spring of 1968, the Hungarian Revolution was the most direct and far-reaching attempt to challenge and reshape Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Europe prior to the reform policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and the ensuing revolutions of 1989. It began as a spontaneous movement for political change by students, intellectuals, and workers inspired by the ongoing process of de-Stalinization (the reaction against Stalin that began in the Soviet Union with the coming to power of Nikita Khrushchev) and the events of the so-called Polish October of 1956, during which a new, reformist leader associated with Polish national causes had risen to power in Warsaw. The movement escalated into a mass uprising and for a brief moment brought about a victorious revolution with far-reaching political and national aims. Although the Hungarian Revolution was suppressed violently by the Red Army, the events discredited Soviet-style socialism and left a legacy of discontent that a played an important role in precipitating the ultimate collapse of the communism in Hungary in 1989 (see Collapse of Communism).

II

Background to the Revolution

The long-term roots of the Hungarian Revolution lie in the imposition of a harsh system of Stalinist rule on the country in the years after 1948. Under the primary leadership of Mátyás Rákosi, the Communist Party had pursued a policy of rapid heavy industrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture, combined with severe political repression, the most grotesque manifestation of which had been the show trials of László Rajk and other high-ranking Communist leaders. By the time of Stalin’s death in 1953, these policies had brought Hungary to the brink of economic collapse. Under pressure from the new collective leadership in the Soviet Union, Rákosi reluctantly agreed to some reforms. While holding on to his post as first secretary of the Communist Party, he agreed in July 1953 to appoint as new premier the moderate Communist Imre Nagy, and over the next two years the country pursued a so-called New Course policy, identified with Nagy, featuring greater investment in light industries and consumer goods, de-collectivization, and lessened repression. However, following a power shift in Moscow, which led to the fall of Georgy Malenkov—the most prominent champion of such reform policies—in early 1955, Rákosi removed Nagy from power and tried to reassert Stalinist priorities. By 1956 his efforts had run into increasing difficulties, in part because Moscow’s growing interest in de-Stalinization, exemplified by Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, and in part because of opposition at home, particularly from disillusioned writers and other intellectuals within the Party. In July 1956 the Soviet leaders had had enough: they coaxed Rákosi into resigning as head of the Communist Party and replaced him with Ernö Gerö, a party functionary closely identified with Rákosi. This proved to be a false move, however, as it signalled readiness for change yet failed to defuse the growing discontent in Hungary.

The short-term catalyst for the Hungarian Revolution came from the so-called Polish October. Popular pressure for political change had been growing in Poland since the bloody suppression of riots by workers in the town of Poznań in June 1956. With strikes and unrest spreading, the Polish Politburo decided on October 19 to hand the first secretaryship of the Communist Party to Władysław Gomułka, a figure well liked by the population for his association with reformist and Polish nationalist causes. Fearful of the cost of a possible military intervention, the Soviet Union reluctantly accepted that move. Their acquiescence was interpreted by many Hungarians as a triumph for Polish nationalism and an opportunity for far-going changes in Hungary as well.

III

The Events of the Revolution

The uprising in Hungary started with spontaneous political meetings and demonstrations in Budapest. Inspired by the events in Poland, large numbers of students, intellectuals, and workers met at the city’s Technical University on October 22 and drew up a list of far-reaching demands, including freedom of speech, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the holding of free, multiparty elections, and the return to power of Imre Nagy. On the following day, mass demonstrations took place across the city, and as the crowds tried to storm the main radio broadcasting offices in central Budapest, the security police fired on the unarmed people, leaving several dead. After that, events quickly escalated. Violence between the demonstrators and the security police spread, in Budapest and elsewhere in the country, and as much of the Hungarian army remained neutral or even sided with the crowds, the Revolution had begun.

Frightened by the uprising in Hungary and its possible implications for the Eastern bloc, the Soviet leadership decided to intervene militarily. By October 24 Soviet troops and tanks were out in strength, but their presence only provoked the Hungarians, and Budapest in particular descended into chaos. Under pressure from the continued violence, the Hungarian government, in consultation with Moscow, made important leadership changes on October 25: János Kádár, a victim of Rákosi’s earlier purges, replaced Gerö as first secretary of the Party and, more significantly, Imre Nagy became prime minister. Over the next few days the Red Army also halted its military intervention throughout Hungary. For a time it seemed as if Hungary might follow a course similar to the Polish October, provided that Nagy could balance the demands for change from the revolutionary crowds with the Soviet Union’s interest in stability and control.

That was not to be, however. As the crowds in Budapest and elsewhere grew increasingly radical, attacking secret police officials and demanding political transformations, Nagy committed himself to the revolutionary cause. On October 30 and 31 he re-established multiparty democracy, formed a coalition government with non-Communist political groupings, withdrew Hungary from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (see Warsaw Pact), and proclaimed his country’s neutrality. This was too much for the Soviet Union, which began to prepare a military crackdown while ostensibly continuing negotiations with Nagy’s government. The Soviet invasion started on November 4. Although the Red Army encountered significant armed resistance, it was able to suppress the uprising within a few days, but with considerable cost: at least 2,000 Hungarians and about 640 Soviet soldiers died during the failed Revolution, and much of central Budapest was heavily damaged. The Soviet military intervention was facilitated by the prevailing international constellation: the events in Hungary coincided with the Suez Crisis, and the spectacle of French and British paratroopers landing in Egypt just as Soviet tanks rolled through Budapest made it difficult for the West to issue a convincing condemnation of the Soviet intervention. In addition, the United States government under President Eisenhower had been secretly assuring the Soviet Union that it had no intention of getting involved in Hungary. As a result, the Hungarian insurgents received no external assistance of any significance, which made their defeat unavoidable.

The Soviet intervention predictably caused a leadership change in Hungary. Nagy, who had fled to the Yugoslav Embassy during the final Soviet intervention, was eventually captured, tried, and, in June 1958, executed. The country’s new leader was János Kádár, who had collaborated with the Soviet invaders and issued an invitation for them to suppress the Revolution by force. Extensive reprisals followed: some 300 revolutionaries were executed and another 22,000 sentenced to prison terms. Over 200,000 Hungarians fled to the West. However, having re-imposed order and Communist control, Kádár gradually steered Hungary to its own form of national communism. Under his leadership, which lasted until 1988, the country implemented a series of reforms that introduced market mechanisms to the economy and conceded limited civil liberties.

IV

Consequences of the Revolution

The Hungarian Revolution was a crucial event in post-1945 European history. On the international plane, it highlighted the Soviet Union’s refusal to allow open challenges to its control over Eastern Europe. But the violent crackdown also undermined the Soviet Union’s prestige, feeding an undercurrent of discontent in Eastern Europe and provoking a wave of resignations among Communist Party members in western and neutral countries. At the same time, the events in Hungary exposed the West’s unwillingness to intervene in the Soviet sphere of influence, despite the Eisenhower administration’s rhetoric about liberation and roll-back in the communist world. The international end effect of the Hungarian Revolution was therefore to confirm, for the time being, the stability of the Cold War blocs that had evolved in Europe after 1945.

Within Hungary, the Revolution left a complicated and contested legacy, as reflected in subsequent interpretations of it. According to the official Communist Party line, the uprising was a retrograde, fascist-inspired attempt at capitalist restoration. Independent experts and commentators, as well as reform communists and dissidents, have provided alternative interpretations, stressing the aborted Revolution’s social democratic, patriotic, or communitarian characteristics. The resulting debates, which are ongoing, helped to crystallize opposition to communism and pave the way for its collapse in Hungary in 1989. Befittingly, the immediate catalyst for that process was an event rooted in the 1956 Revolution: the reburial of Imre Nagy on June 16, 1989, the 31st anniversary of his execution—a public spectacle that turned into a mass demonstration against Communist rule.