Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

I

Introduction

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), negotiations that began in November 1969 between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the regulation of the nuclear weapons competition between the two nations. A wide range of weapons was discussed, and these and a series of subsequent negotiations have resulted in several treaties and less formal agreements.

II

Background

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 led to the conclusion of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In 1964 the United States approached the Soviet Union to suggest bilateral talks on the possible agreed limitation of strategic nuclear forces. At that time the United States had a clear superiority in nuclear arms, but indications showed that the Soviet Union was developing weapons that could undermine the American posture. This, along with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Communist China, created additional complications for US strategic planners. These two factors, along with an abiding American public interest in arms control, led to a search for negotiated limits to the growth of the superpower arsenals. It was also perceived by some that some such bilateral agreement would be a necessary precondition to encourage other as yet non-nuclear states to consider an abstention or non-proliferation treaty.

III

Accords

The negotiations known as SALT I began in November 1969 and ended in January 1972, with agreement on two documents: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Both were signed on May 26, 1972. SALT II talks began in September 1972 and ended in January 1979.

A

The ABM Treaty

The emerging forms of defensive systems threatened to negate limited deterrents, and it was thought that hopes for limiting offensive weapons depended on removing this threat. The ABM Treaty limited the numbers of allowed weapons and radars and regulated their composition and location, but allowed continued testing and development. Both signatories agreed to limit the placement of ABM systems within their own national territories, and both agreed not to build any systems other than the static and therefore verifiable land-based types then already developed or deployed. The signatories also agreed not to enter into any accord with third parties that would contravene the treaty. Verification was provided by “national technical means”—that is, the use of any detective technology commanded by either signatory—which were thus acknowledged as legitimate tools of intelligence under international law. The treaty also established a Standing Consultative Commission charged with monitoring violations and considering further arms-control proposals. Although of unlimited duration, the treaty was subject to review every five years, with a six-month withdrawal notification time.