Napoleon I

I

Introduction

Napoleon I (1769-1821), First Consul of the French Republic (1799-1804) as Napoleon Bonaparte, and Emperor of the French (1804-1814; March-June 1815). The single most dominant figure in modern European history before Adolf Hitler, his life has become a modern epic. Napoleon emerged from relative obscurity to lead France and enacted seminal institutional reforms. He then won a series of spectacular campaigns between 1805 and 1807, making France and himself the virtual masters of Europe and securing his almost mythical status as a soldier. He was decisively defeated in Russia in 1812, abdicating in 1814, only to return in 1815 for the “Hundred Days”, and was finally defeated at Waterloo. Napoleon dictated memoirs in exile that forged his own legend. His administrative reforms outlived his military exploits and still mark Europe today.

II

Childhood, Youth, and Early Career

Napoleon was born Napoleone Buonaparte, the second son of Carlo and Letezia Buonaparte in Ajaccio, Corsica, on August 15, 1769. He was one of eight children: Joseph (1768-1844), whom Napoleon made first King of Naples and then King of Spain; Lucien (1775-1840), his first Minister of the Interior; Élisa (1777-1820), created Archduchess of Tuscany; Louis (1778-1846), made King of Holland; Pauline (1780-1825); Caroline (1782-1839), created Queen of Naples in 1808; and Jérôme (1784-1860), made King of Westphalia. Even the circumstances of his birth are surrounded in legend, for it has been claimed—improbably—that his mother gave birth to him alone and unaided. His family, of modest bourgeois status, was embroiled in the many personal and political feuds that plagued the island, which had been ceded by Genoa to France only in 1768. Originally supporters of the struggle for independence led by Pasquale Paoli, the family changed sides around 1771, when the French recognized their claims to nobility. In 1779, thanks to this collaboration, Carlo placed Napoleon and Joseph in college in Autun, in Burgundy, then in Brienne, and finally at the military academy in Paris, in 1784. He did not return to Corsica until 1786, and saw his parents only three times between 1779 and 1786. Napoleon was desperately unhappy at school, developing virulent anti-French, pro-Corsican feelings. He never mastered French and all his life retained a marked regional accent.

In the late 1780s, Napoleon was a garrison officer, largely untouched by the French Revolution of 1789. He spent most of the early years of the Revolution in Corsica; despite his early leanings, he joined the pro-French faction. By 1793 the whole family was forced to flee to Toulon and never returned. The years 1792 to 1794 marked the Reign of Terror and the ascendancy of the Committee of Public Safety, dominated by the radical Maxmilien Robespierre. In Toulon, Napoleon accepted the patronage of his brother, Augustin Robespierre, and distinguished himself with his mastery of artillery when the British besieged Toulon. When the Committee fell from power in August 1794, Napoleon was jailed and faced execution but was reprieved. In 1795 he rose to be General of the Army of the West, charged with repressing the royalist Vendéan revolt. Napoleon avoided these duties by transferring to the Topographical Bureau in Paris. This shrewd, if unheroic, conduct has been interpreted as an early sign of his political acumen, but also of his desire to remain “above faction” in the maze of Revolutionary politics, that would mark his approach to government after 1799. While in Paris he came to the attention of Paul Barras, a member of the executive, the Directory, who charged him with crushing the royalist rising of August 1795, known by the revolutionary month “Vendémiaire”. It was in the course of this action that Napoleon is reputed to have said that “a whiff of grapeshot” was enough to end a revolution. This proved the first major advance in his career and his personal life. In March 1796, Napoleon became General of the Army of Italy, his first great command; Barras also introduced him to his ex-mistress, Joséphine de Beauharnais. She remained, incontestably, the great love of Napoleon’s life, despite her many infidelities. They were married just before he left for the Italian front. Napoleon had several close relationships in his life, all marked by genuine fondness on both sides. He was a good husband to Marie-Louise of Austria, his second wife, and taught her many political skills she used later as Duchess of Parma. The Polish Countess Marie Walewska, bore him a son for whom he provided well; she remained fiercely loyal to him, even after his fall. In his early years, Napoleon was a thin, small figure, and unpretentious in dress, but deeply emotional, known for his remarkable memory and sharp intelligence. He did not stand out from his military rivals, but he was a commanding personal presence.

III

From General to Statesman, 1796-1800

The Italian front was a sideshow in the war between France and the coalition powers; those in Switzerland and on the Rhine, under Generals Victor Moreau, Louis Hoche, and Charles Pichegru were of greater importance (see French Revolutionary Wars). However, Napoleon turned Italy into an unrivalled military success. Above all, he displayed a remarkable combination of political and diplomatic skills to consolidate his military victories, in ways the other generals did not. There was little in his early career to hint at these talents, but these years revealed the essence of what was to follow.

In his first Italian campaign (1796-1797) Napoleon effectively brought the entire peninsula under French control, thus establishing his military reputation. He then forced the Austrians to let him redraw the map of Italy at theTreaty of Campo Formio, in October 1797. Napoleon acted on his own initiative throughout, the Directory trailing behind. Campo Formio confirmed the existence of Napoleon’s first political creation, the Cispadane (later the Cisalpine) Republic, carved out of the former Austrian-ruled provinces of northern Italy. Aided by the pro-French minority of Italian “patriots” Napoleon made himself president of the new state, giving it a constitution based on that of France, but with a much stronger one-man executive. Napoleon was seldom an innovator at any time in his career, and “sister republics” were not new, but the Cisalpine was the first such to emerge as the work of a single general. Napoleon used it as a power base, from whence he despatched troops to crush a coup against the Directory, a clear sign of the regime’s dependence on the military, and of Napoleon’s direct interest in internal politics. He also attended the Congress of Rastadt, in Germany, where he did much to undermine Austrian influence among the smaller states.

Napoleon returned to Paris in triumph in December 1797. In May 1798 he was sent to capture Egypt, then a semi-autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire, in hopes he would succeed but in the sure knowledge he would be out of politics. Narrowly evading the British fleet commanded by Horatio Nelson, Napoleon defeated the Mamelukes—the military aristocracy who ruled Egypt—and set about reforming the country along French lines, although in Cairo he declared that he and his whole army would convert to Islam, if it would help secure his rule. The Egyptian campaign produced major scientific and archaeological discoveries by the team of academics Napoleon brought with him, the most famous being the discovery and transportation to France of the Rosetta Stone. The campaign ended ingloriously and in an act of cynicism bordering on cowardice, Napoleon abandoned his troops and returned to France.

Egypt saved Napoleon from association with the even greater military disasters France had experienced in his absence. By 1799 Italy was lost and there were defeats on the Rhine; for the first time since 1794, France was menaced with invasion and the Directory faced a resurgence of Jacobin and royalist agitation. Several leading politicians, led by Emmanuel Sieyès—a constitutional expert and leader in the early Revolution—now felt the need for a stronger executive that would include a leading general. They had envisioned a coup since 1797, and turned to Napoleon because he was less pro-royalist than Moreau, and less pro-Jacobin than Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (later Charles XIV John), Napoleon’s clearest rivals. The coup took its name, the 18 Brumaire, from the date in the Revolutionary calendar on which it fell (November 9-10, 1799) and the politics behind it have always been unclear. Napoleon stormed the assemblies with his guard to proclaim the new constitution and coerce the deputies into agreement; he almost lost his nerve, stumbled over his speech, and was saved only by the intervention of his brother, Lucien, himself a deputy. The real keys to success were the indifference of educated public opinion and the neutrality of Moreau and Bernadotte.

Napoleon proved less hesitant in power. The Directory was replaced by a provisional Consulate composed of Napoleon, the legal expert Jean Jacques Cambacérès and the financial expert Charles Lebrun, who remained among Napoleon’s closest aides. For Napoleon it was only a springboard and he bullied Sieyès into designating him ”First Consul”. His rapid rise to supreme power might have been more predictable to contemporaries had they paid more attention to his political activities in Italy and Egypt. His first priority was the war emergency, however. Napoleon confided the more important fronts of Switzerland and the Rhine to Moreau, who rewarded his trust with a crushing victory over the Austrians at Hohenlinden. Napoleon took the Italian front, and his defeat of the Austrians at Marengo on June 14, 1800, returned Italy to French rule and soon ended the war. The Treaty of Lunéville of February 1801 generally reproduced the terms of Campo Formio. Austria’s influence among the smaller German states was also now weakened. By the Treaty of Amiens of March 1802, Britain made peace with France. France was now the dominant power in western Europe. Internally, these lightning victories confirmed the usefulness of having united in one person, the roles of the civilian chief executive and commander-in-chief: Napoleon.

IV

The Reform of France, 1800-1805

Despite the rapid breakdown of the terms of Amiens, the first five years of the 19th century was peaceful on the continent; the war between Britain and France was fought mainly at sea and in the colonies. Napoleon used this respite to carry out a series of seminal reforms that built on the work of the French Revolution but ensured the emergence of a highly centralized, essentially dictatorial system of government. Many of these reforms still form the foundations of modern France and of most of the states of western Europe. These years saw Napoleon forge his most lasting legacy as a statesman.

Napoleon created the office of Prefect in 1800. Henceforth, each department had as its executive head a civil servant appointed by the First Consul, and directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior; this still forms the basis for French local government. Napoleon chose new men for these posts with the help of Lucien, and ensured they came from outside their departments, to help extinguish the factionalism that had marked the revolutionary years.

The guiding principle of Napoleon’s policy was to keep his regime “above faction”. It became a rallying cry for Bonapartists in the 19th century. On one level, this meant a licence to establish a dictatorship; on another, it won him much tacit support by creating a professional, stable administration. To this end, the regime elaborated the twin policies of “rallying” and “amalgamation”. The former encouraged royalists and Jacobins to support the regime; the latter, to work together in its administration. “Amalgamation” expressed itself at the very apex of the regime, when Napoleon confided the powerful Ministry of Police to the ex-revolutionary, Joseph Fouché, and Foreign Affairs to the ex-noble, Charles Talleyrand. When royalists attempted to assassinate Napoleon in 1800, he conveniently blamed the Jacobins, deporting 130 of them; as if to balance his oppression, in 1804, he arrested and executed the royalist émigré, the Duc d’Enghien, on trumped-up charges of treason; Moreau was deported in the same year. An amnesty was offered to all émigré nobles in 1800, while many ex-Jacobins rose to power in Fouché’s police. The effectiveness of these policies is debatable, for the divisions of the Revolution resurfaced in the 19th century, and deeply informed the French responses to the Nazi occupation and the Vichy regime during World War II.

The reforms Napoleon oversaw in these years won his regime important support, at least among the propertied classes. In 1800 the Banque de France was created, giving the country an official regulatory bank for the first time, although by 1814 its role in the economy was still evolving. The compilation of a national property register, the cadastre began—only completed in the 1820s—that henceforth set taxation on a fair, transparent footing. A new system of state secondary schools, the lycées, was set up; their curriculum was supervised directly by the newly founded University of France, itself under direct state control.

The greatest reforms of the Consulate were the Concordat of 1801 with the Papacy and the Civil Code—the Code Napoléon—completed in 1804. The Concordat restored relations with the Catholic Church, but very much on Napoleon’s terms: Catholicism did not become the state religion, as it had been before the Revolution, but “the religion of the majority of Frenchmen”, thus assuring freedom of conscience; nor did the Church get back the extensive properties it lost under the Revolution. Nevertheless, the Church now received direct state support and normal religious life resumed in France after a decade of disruption. By 1809, relations with Rome had deteriorated to the point that Napoleon invaded the Papal States and imprisoned the Pope, Pius VII; the Concordat was mutually repudiated in 1810. The Code proved more lasting, guaranteeing civil liberties, equality before the law, and the equal division of property among heirs. Its restrictive divorce laws and patriarchal view of the family have been much criticized, but its fundamental provisions still govern France and many other European countries where it was subsequently adopted. Napoleon personally supervised much of this work. Conversely, responding to revolts in the Caribbean, Napoleon reversed the humanitarianism of the early revolutionaries, re-establishing slavery in the colonies. These reforms were accompanied by the strengthening of the Gendarmerie, the paramilitary rural police force, which won respect and odium in equal measure, for its suppression of banditry and for enforcing the mass conscription Napoleon needed to fuel his war machine. It made government more effective than ever before.

Significantly, it was this period of relative peace, when his priority was internal reform, which truly consolidated his power, rather than the later years of military victory abroad. He became “Consul for Life” in 1802, by plebiscite, an electoral tactic he made his own as a way of disguising the impotence of the series of complex elected assemblies created in 1799. Plebiscites became synonymous with Bonapartism under the Second Empire. In December 1804—ten years after he faced the death penalty for his Jacobin connections—Napoleon crowned himself “Emperor of the French” in the cathedral of Notre Dame, in the presence of the Pope, and in almost vulgar splendour. The title was important, emphasizing the difference between this “republican monarchy” and the divine-right kingship of the old order. Napoleon himself said he had “found the crown of France lying in the gutter” and picked it up. In official parlance, the French Republic was not abolished, but “entrusted to a hereditary dynasty”. A new “imperial nobility” was created, but it was very different from the feudal aristocracy of the past: except for the Imperial family titles were conferred only for military or public service, and carried no fiscal or social privileges.

At the time, Napoleon argued this was necessary for France to deal with the great Houses of Europe on an equal basis. In fact, it only helped push them into a new war. By 1805 Britain found it easy to coax Austria and Russia into another coalition against France. No one had counted on facing a country so strengthened and thoroughly reformed, however.