French Revolutionary Wars

I

Introduction

French Revolutionary Wars, the title given to the series of conflicts that broke out in Europe in 1792 in the wake of the French Revolution and that raged unabated for the next ten years. Finally brought to an end by the Treaty of Amiens in May 1802, they saw France ranged against two different coalitions of which the first survived from 1792 to 1797 and the second from 1798 to 1801. At no time, however, were these alliances static in their make-up. At the beginning of the War of the First Coalition in April 1792, France faced Austria and Prussia alone, but in 1793 these two powers were joined by Britain, Spain, Portugal, the United Provinces (or Netherlands), most of the minor states of Germany and Italy and, in theory, Russia. Yet by 1797 only Austria and Britain remained at war with the French, and in that year even the former was also forced to make peace. And, as for the War of the First Coalition, so for the War of the Second Coalition. In 1798, France faced Britain—the only power to remain continuously at war with France once it had entered the conflict—Naples, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire; in 1799 this array was joined by Austria; and in 1800 Russia suddenly abandoned her allies and switched to a policy of neutrality. Nor was France fighting alone. Thanks to the conquests of its armies, it was able to establish a variety of satellite states in the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Italy, and in 1796 it was voluntarily joined by Spain.

II

Interpreting the French Revolutionary Wars

Contained in these simple facts are a number of important truths. According to tradition, the conflict of 1792-1802 was an ideological war—indeed, a total war—that saw the French Revolution confront the Old Order in a titanic battle that could only end in the complete overthrow of one or other of the two contenders, and that saw the two sides throw their very all against one another. Yet common sense alone militates against this idea. Setting aside the fact that few of the monarchical states were wholehearted in their prosecution of the war even when they were fighting France—for example, though notionally at war with France since 1792, Russia did not actually attack it until 1798—few of them had any difficulty with the idea of a compromise peace, and fewer still much interest in the restoration of the Bourbons: Spain and Prussia made peace with France in 1795—a step that automatically implied recognition of the Republic; Austria made peace with France in 1797 and 1801; and Britain followed in 1802. And, supposing the whole of Europe had indeed been joined in a great crusade against France, for all the latter’s resources of wealth, population, and revolutionary fervour, it is hard to see how it could have survived for very long. On the contrary, what one might have expected was not the long and protracted struggle that actually occurred but rather a short, sharp struggle, and, what is more, one crowned by complete defeat for France. As the war dragged on for a full decade, and ended with France in a dominant position, the inference is obvious: there was neither the ideological struggle nor the total war of legend.

All the more can this be seen to be the case if we look at France. For a brief moment in 1793, certainly, the Republic embarked on an attempt to revolutionize the whole of Europe. But this policy did not survive longer than a few months: as soon as Maximilien Robespierre came to power, the idea was effectively abandoned. As for Robespierre’s own contribution to the legend—the mass recruitment, or levée en masse, of August 1793—this was introduced primarily as a defensive measure, and under the Thermidorians and their successors was generally honoured more in the breach than the observance. From 1795 onwards, French foreign policy was marked far more by national interest than revolutionary zeal. As useful tools of military and political control, satellite republics were established in most areas into which the French armies penetrated—above all, the United Provinces, Switzerland, and Italy—but this policy was as often the work of ambitious generals as it was of the government of the Republic, while the foreign revolutionaries who rallied to France’s cause were generally abandoned without a second thought whenever the strategic situation demanded retrenchment: in 1797, for example, most of the Republic of Venice was handed over to Austria in the Treaty of Campo Formio, while in 1799 the Roman and Parthenopean Republics were both evacuated without a shot being fired in their defence. On occasion, just as Britain made use of royalism as a “fifth column” in France, so revolutionary subversion was made use of as a weapon of war—in 1796, for example, a substantial army was sent to assist the cause of nationalist rebellion in Ireland. However, no foreigner could ever count on French support: when revolt finally broke out in Ireland in 1798, for example, the help that arrived was derisory (see Society of United Irishmen).

Further reason for reconsidering the Revolutionary Wars may be found in the revisionist arguments of such historians as Tim Blanning and Paul Schroeder. For reasons of space, the complicated case put forward in their works cannot be expounded at any length in this article, but, in brief, they see the conflict of 1792-1802 as being part of a much wider series of wars that began with the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and the Ottoman Empire in the autumn of 1787 (see Habsburg-Ottoman Wars). According to this scheme of things, a series of structural problems in the international relations of the period ensured that the final decade of the 18th century was certain to see a conflagration of immense proportions in Europe. The French Revolution was therefore sucked into a general dynastic conflict that was already in train rather than precipitating a new age of ideological war.

III

The War of the First Coalition, 1792-1797

What, though, of the actual events of the French Revolutionary Wars? Fighting began in April 1792 when France (at this point still a monarchy) declared war on Austria in response to what was perceived—entirely wrongly—as a threat to intervene against the revolutionary settlement in France. Much to French disappointment, Austria was joined by Prussia (it had been hoped that the Prussians would actually go to war against Austria in alliance with France), and at first the fighting did not go well: a French invasion of Belgium was routed and in September 1792 a substantial Austro-Prussian army invaded north-eastern France. In the interim, however, desperate efforts on the part of General Dumouriez to train and discipline his unruly forces had given the French army greater capacity on the battlefield, and on September 20 the invasion was faced down at the so-called Battle of Valmy. An almost bloodless affair, this saw the coalition commander lose his nerve and shy away from attacking Dumouriez’s motley forces: had he pressed home his advance, it seems more than likely that the French would have been swept from the field.

Not surprisingly, Valmy further revivified the French war effort, while at the same time radicalizing the domestic situation: Belgium and the Rhineland were successfully overrun, while France became a republic and witnessed the execution of Louis XIV and Marie Antoinette. Within a matter of months a surfeit of enthusiasm had led Paris to declare war on almost the whole of Europe, but in acting thus the revolutionaries had gone too far: lacking the strength to maintain their position, the French army was ejected from both Belgium and the Rhineland. Still worse, revolt also broke out at home, especially in Lyon, Toulon, and in the district of western France known as the Vendée. There followed the great crisis of 1793, the levée en masse, and the implementation for the first time of a radical social agenda designed to give the common people of France something to fight for. Under the energetic leadership of Lazare Carnot and a new generation of young officers of more-or-less humble backgrounds, this proved enough to save the Republic, though it also helped a great deal that the foreign armies that had crossed the frontier proved slow and indecisive in their movements, preferring on the whole to besiege France’s many frontier fortresses rather than seeking decisive triumphs in the field.

By the middle of 1794, then, all was well again: domestic revolt had been overcome; foreign invasion repelled; and Belgium and the Rhineland re-occupied, along with the Piedmontese province of Savoy. At Boulou, Tourcoing, and Fleurus, the French armies had won major battles, while for the first time they had also penetrated beyond the so-called “natural frontiers” by invading northern Spain. Nor is any of this surprising: in 1793-1794 Britain sent many troops to take part in colonial operations in the West Indies. At the same time, Prussia kept most of her troops away from the war with France altogether, preferring instead to use them in Poland against the revolt that had broken out there in protest at Russia’s de facto control of that country. As a result of this affair, Poland was wiped off the map, but the French continued to flourish, something that the capture of many of her West-Indian territories by the British did nothing to slow down. In 1795 the French overran the United Provinces and transformed it into the so-called Batavian Republic, while in the summer of that year both Prussia and Spain made peace. And in 1796 matters got still worse for the Coalition: Spain now joined France in her war against Britain, while a hitherto all but unknown Corsican named Napoleon Bonaparte knocked Piedmont out of the war and overran northern Italy. All that was left of the First Coalition were Britain and Austria, and in May 1797 further defeats led the latter to make peace as well. At this point Britain, too, might have given up, but peace negotiations broke down, and she therefore fought on alone.

IV

The War of the Second Coalition, 1798-1802

It was not long before Britain obtained fresh allies. Having previously taken over Rome, Piedmont, and Switzerland, in September 1798 an army headed by Napoleon Bonaparte sailed for Egypt. A bizarre move that has never been explained completely satisfactorily, this immediately plunged France into war with the Ottoman Empire, Naples, and Russia. In Egypt things went badly wrong: Nelson shattered the French fleet at Abu Qir, while an invasion of Palestine was checked before the walls of Acre. Meanwhile, back in Europe the Austrians joined the new alliance—the Second Coalition—and invaded northern Italy with the backing of the Russian army. Very soon the French were reeling back in defeat, and they were also forced to abandon Naples, which they had briefly managed to occupy and republicanize. Eventually, the situation was stabilized, but for the time being all of Italy had been lost, while a seaborne invasion of the Batavian Republic was only repelled with some difficulty. It was therefore to a badly shaken France that Napoleon returned when he decided to abandon the garrison of Egypt in October 1799. In the midst of political chaos, he soon managed to establish himself as de facto ruler of France. Aided by the fact that inter-allied quarrels had led Russia effectively to pull out of the war, Napoleon soon ended the stalemate. Invading Italy once more, he shattered the Austrians at Marengo, and in December a second victory at Hohenlinden—the work not of Napoleon but General Moreau—again knocked them out of the war. Unable to intervene in Europe, the British did manage to reconquer Egypt, but 1801 saw them faced not just by the French but also a new league led by Russia that sought to protect the rights of neutral shipping. This last was broken by a naval victory at Copenhagen, but Britain was exhausted and suffering serious economic difficulties. Prepared to offer France very favourable terms, in May 1802 she made peace by means of the Treaty of Amiens. The French Revolutionary Wars were at an end.

See also Napoleonic Wars.